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BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES AND THE NEED 
TO SEPARATE TRUST DEPARTMENTS 
FROM LARGE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
Thomas J. Schoenbaum* 
Commercial banks are undergoing a period of fundamental 
change. During the past fifteen years, larger banks have joined the 
general trend toward diversification and growth by expanding into 
many nonbanking areas as well as by extending their operations 
into regional, national, and foreign markets. They have developed 
holding company structures that have aggressively sought bank 
mergers and acquisitions. In addition to their traditional role as 
depository institutions and suppliers and allocators of short term 
credit to commerce and industry, banks also have become heavily 
engaged in mortgage banking, consumer credit, management of 
real estate investment trusts, and many other businesses. 1 
The movement toward diversification and growth has, however, 
been called into question. The 1973-1974 recession came at a time 
when many commercial banks had overextended their financial 
resources. In many cases this was due to interest-free loans to 
unprofitable nonbank subsidiaries. Several large banks failed, and 
many more were placed on "problem" lists by regulatory au-
thorities. 2 Disclosure of this has helped to undermine the public's 
confidence in the nation's banking industry. 
Events such as these, as well as the recent "credit crunch," 
have generated attempts to reform financial institutions. Congress 
is considering legislation to consolidate the tripartite system of 
federal bank regulation by the Federal Reserve Board, the Comp-
troller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpor-
*Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. B.A., 1961, St. Joseph's College; J .D., 
1965, University of Michigan. , 
I am grateful to my research assistant, H. M. "Buzz''. Burwell, J.D., University of North 
Carolina, 1976, for his help and counsel. 
1 Under the Bank Holding Company Amendments of 1970, one-bank holding companies, 
which previously had been virtually exempt from restrictions with respect to the acquisition 
of companies engaged in nonbanking activities, were subjected to the same restrictions as 
multibank holding companies. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850, 1971-1978 (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 225 
(1976). Bank mergers are regulated under the Bank Merger Act of 1960 as amended in 1966. 
12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1970). Bank regulatory agencies have been quite permissive, however, in 
the regulation of bank mergers and holding company activity. See Reid, Legislation, Regu-
lation, Antitrust, and Bank Mergers, 92 BANKING L.J. 6, 28-29 (1975). 
2See, e.g., Citibank, Chase Manhattan on U.S. 'Problem List,' Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1976, 
at I, col. I; Holding-Firm Concept Turns Sour for Banks as Profits Fall Short, Wall St. J ., 
Apr. 20, 1976, at_ I, col. 6. 
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ation into a Federal Banking Commission3 because of an alleged 
"race of laxity" between the different regulatory agencies, exacer-
bated by attempts of banks to choose their regulators. 4 In an effort 
to remove restrictions on competition among financial institutions 
and to increase the supply of credit, legislation has been proposed 
to permit thrift institutions, savings and loan associations, savings 
banks, and credit unions to offer checking account services and to 
allow the payment of interest on checking account deposits. Thrift 
institutions would be granted the power to make consumer loans, 
invest in debt securities, and handle trust accounts; commercial 
banks would be given increased incentives for home mortgage 
lending. 5 In addition, Congress and the SEC are considering 
whether to compel increased disclosure by banks and bank holding 
companies. 6 
The recent financial and regulatory stresses have caused many 
commercial banks to rethink their involvement in nonbanking 
areas of business. Increasingly, they are divesting themselves of 
their nonbanking subsidiaries in order to concentrate on more 
3S. 2298, 94th Cong., fst Sess. (1975). This bill was introduced by Senator Proxmire and 
was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 121 CoNG. 
REc. 15374 (1975). Similar legislation is being considered in the House of Representatives. 
See HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY AND HOUSING, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY (FINE) DISCUSSION PRINCIPLES, 
(Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as FINE REPORT]. These proposals have a long 
history, beginning with the U.S. PRESIDENT'S CoMM. ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE REGULA-
TION, REPORT at iii (1972), which is commonly known as the Hunt Comm. Report, after its 
chairman, Reed 0. Hunt. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AF-
FAIRS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AcT OF 1975, s. Rpt. No. 94-487, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1975). 
At this writing, the prospect for passage of a far-reaching reform bill appears to have 
dimmed, especially in the House. See Bank Lobby Cashes in on Grass-Roots Power to Sway 
Legislators, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1976, at I, col. 6; House Democrats in Retreat on Overhaul 
of Bank Laws, Split Proposal into 3 Bills, Wall St. J., Mar. 3 I, 1976, at 3, col. 2; Watered-
Down Measure to Revise the Fed Further Weakened, Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1976, at 6, col. 2. 
•For a case study of such attempts, see Changing Charters, Did the Bank Switch Rather 
Than Fight the Fed Examiners?, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1976, at I, col. 6. 
5S. 1267, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The bill is subtitled: An Act to Expand Competi-
tion, Provide Improved Consumer Services, Strengthen the Ability of Financial Institutions 
to Adjust to Changing Economic Conditions, and Improve the Flow of Funds for Mortgage 
Credit. Analogous legislation is being considered by the House Banking Committee. See 
FINE REPORT, supra note 3. This legislation also grew out of the Hunt Comm. Report, supra 
note 3. 
6These disclosure proposals have been made in the wake of the fact that several large 
banks are on the "watch list" of the Comptroller of the Currency. Unlike the SEC, bank 
regulatory agencies consider disclosure of financial instability of banks as needlessly 
exacerbating concern over the nation's banking system. Fed Aide Sees Problem-Bank 
Disclosures Spurring Needless Concern Over System, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, I 976, at 6, col. 2. 
Like other corporations, banks are subject to the registration and continuous disclosure 
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U .S.C. § 781 (1970), but§ 12(i), 15 
U .S.C. § 78I(i) vests enforcement jurisdiction in the bank regulatory agencies and imposes 
substantially fewer requirements on banks than the SEC imposes on other corporations. See 
Mann, Securities Disclosure Requirements-Vive La Difference, 92 BANKING L.J. 109 
(1975). See also Rising Disclosures About Problem Banks May Erode Confidence, Wall St. 
J., Jan. 23, 1976, at 26, col. I. 
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traditional concerns. 7 At the same time, however, banks are con-
sidering the possibilities of expanded services to their traditional 
customers, which would involve not only taking deposits and mak-
ing short and medium term loans, but also "merchant banking"-
offering a full range of money management and financial services to 
business and individual customers. 8 Thus, it appears that banks 
will become increasingly involved in securities activities such as 
arranging private placements of securities, providing agency and 
investment services to give customers more cqnvenient access to 
the securities markets, and offering financial advisory services. 9 
As this trend continues, new questions of public policy must be 
examined. What will be the impact of these activities on the in-
vestment banking community and financial markets? How valid 
are the restrictions of the Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall 
Act), 10 which have limited the entry of banks into the securities 
business? Are new regulatory structures needed? This article (1) 
analyzes the traditional Glass-Steagall Act restrictions on banks 
and the leading case of Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 11 
where the Supreme Court held that the offering by commercial 
banks of commingled agency accounts violated the Glass-Steagall 
Act prohibition against underwriting securities, (2) considers the. 
developments since that decision, and (3) offers suggestions on an 
approach to devising solutions to the policy questions involved. 
I. GLASS-STEAGALL ACT RESTRICTIONS ON BANKS 
AND INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE V. CAMP 
A. The Basic Statutory Restrictions 
The Glass-Steagall Act is the principal law determining the ex-
tent to which banks may engage in securities activities. Passed in 
response to the 1929 stock market collapse, the Act is directed 
toward specific abuses perceived at that time in the operation by 
commercial banks of affiliates which engaged in underwriting se-
curities. The commerical banks often abused their loan powers by 
financing for their customers the purchase of securities underwrit-
ten by affiliates, by making loans to affiliates to finance their 
underwriting activities, and by making loans to corporations who 
1See Commercial Banks Seek More Business From 'Individual Depositors, Borrowers, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 26, 1975, at 16, col. 1; Holding Firm Concept Turns Sour for Banks as 
Profits Fall Short, Wall St. J ., Apr. 20, 1976, at 1, col. 6. 
8Merchant Banking, Is the U.S. Ready For It? Bus. WEEK, Apr. 19, 1976, at 54. 
9/d. 
10Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 StaL 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
11401 U.S. 617 (1971). 
4 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10: l 
agreed to use bank affiliates as underwriters. 12 These abuses com-
promised bank loan policies, caused banks to take undue risks, 
increased speculation in securities, and contributed significantly to 
the widespread failures of commercial banks .13 
Congress considered and rejected regulation of bank securities' 
affiliates and, in enacting the Glass-Steagall Act, chose the extreme 
solution of completely divorcing investment banking from com-
mercial banking. 14 Under sections 1615 and 2016 of the Act, neither 
national banks17 nor their affiliates may engage in the business of 
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities. Section 
2l1 8 prohibits corporations in the business of issuing, selling, or 
underwriting securities from engaging in commercial banking. Fin-
ally, to prevent interlocks of directors or employees, section 3219 
provides that no officer, director, or employee of a business 
primarily engaged in the underwriting or distribution of securities 
may be an officer or director of a member bank of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
This separation of functions did not, however, totally exclude 
commercial banks from securities activities. A 1935 amendment to 
section 16 expressly permits banks to deal in securities to the 
extent. of purchasing and selling them upon the order of and for the 
account of their customers. 20 In addition, the limitations of section 
16 are expressly inapplicable to commercial banks' underwriting of 
obligations of the United States and of general revenue bonds of 
state and local govemments.21 Moreover, banks are permitted to 
purchase investment securities for their own account, subject to 
the regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency. 22 Thus, in 
addition to having important functions as underwriters of federal, 
state, and municipal bonds, banks may buy and sell securities on 
behalf of customers and for their own account. 
Banks buy and sell securities on behalf of customers through the 
operations of their trust departments. The Federal Reserve Act 
granted trust department powers to National Banks in 1913,23 and 
12Operatioil of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems: Hearings Be/ore a 
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency pursuant to S. Res. 71, 71st 
Cong., 3d Sess., Pt. I at 1058, 1063-64 (1931). 
1375 CONG. REc. 9911-12 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). 
14See 75 CONG. REc. 9888 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Glass). 
15 12 u.s.c. § 24 (1970). 
16 12 u .s.c. § 377 (1970). 
17Under 12 U .S.C. § 335 (1970), state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve 
System are subject to the same prohibitions as national banks with respect to dealings in 
securities. 
1812 u.s.c. § 378 (1970). 
1•12 U.S.C. § 78 (1970). 
20Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 308(a), 49 Stat. 709 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970)). 
21 12 u .s.c. § 24 (1970). 
22/d. The applicable regulations may be found in 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.410 (1976). 
23Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6., § 11, 38 Stat. 262 (1913). 
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the Glass-Steagall Act left these powers intact. Pursuant to this 
authority, banks give investment advice to individual investors by 
managing agency accounts. In addition, for many years, banks 
have managed common trust funds for assets entrusted to them in 
their fiduciary capacities as trustees, executors, administrators, 
and guardians. 24 These activities have enjoyed a remarkable 
growth stemming to a considerable extent from the act of Congress 
which in 1962 transferred regulatory jurisdiction of the fiduciary 
activities of national banks from the Federal Reserve Board to the 
Comptroller of the Currency. 25 At the end of 1974, the assets of 
commercial bank trust departments totaled $328 billion, and their 
stock holdings, measured in terms of market value, reached 27 
percent of total stock outstanding. 26 Much of this growth is at-
tributable to banks' management of pension, profit-sharing, and 
other tax benefited plans in common trust funds. 27 
B. Investment Company Institute v. Camp 
In 1971, in Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 28 the Su-
preme Court of the United States faced what it called the "novel 
and substantial" questions raised under the Glass-Steagall Act 
concerning the extent to which commercial banks may engage in 
securities-related activities. The case involved a challenge brought 
by the Investment Company Institute, a trade association of open 
end investment companies, 29 to Regulation 9, 30 issued by the 
Comptroller of the Currency. Regulation 9 authorized for the first 
time the commingling of managing agency accounts as within na-
tional banks' fiduciary powers under section 92a of the Federal 
24The fiduciary powers of national banks are governed by regulations promulgated by"the 
Comptroller of the Currency.12 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9. 104 (1976). 
25 Pub. L. No. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668 (12 U.S.C. § 92a (1970). For an account of the 
development of bank common trust funds, see Saxon and Miller, Common Trust Funds, 53 
GEO. L.J. 994 (1965). 
26Hearings on the Expansion of Commercial Banks' Securities Business Operations and 
the Elimination of Barriers Between the Banking and Securities Industries Before the 
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94.th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Securities Subcomm. Hearings] (statement 
of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, Securities Exchange Commission). This figure was esti-
mated to be $400 billion as of November I, 1975. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLIC 
POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES, AN ISSUES PAPER 7 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ISSUES PAPER, reprinted in Securities Subcomm. Hearings 
22-59]. 
27 E. HERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: COMMERCIAL BANK TRUST DEPARTMENTS 17-18 
(1975) .. 
28401 U.S. 617 (1971). 
"'This type of investment company (commonly called a mutual fund) generally issues only 
redeemable stock which it stands ready at all times to redeem at an amount equal to the net 
asset value of its investment portfolio. See R. JENNINGS AND H. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1441-42 (3d ed. 1972). 
30 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1976). 
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Reserve Act of 1913.31 First National City Bank (Citibank) had 
attempted to take advantage of this authorization by establishing a 
plan to accept deposits of a minimum of $10,000 and to invest the 
funds together with those of other participants. Commingling was 
an essential part of Citibank's plan, because only through the 
economies of scale gained by collective management was it 
economically feasible to make such an offer. Citibank's intention 
was to use this plan to make available to the "small" investor the 
same investment management services that it traditionally offered 
to its wealthy customers. Although the depositor was a principal 
and the bank a managing agent, the account was the functional 
equivalent of a mutual fund, since each customer obtained an 
undivided interest in the fund (expressed as a "unit of participa-
tion") which was redeemable at net asset value. Accordingly, the 
account was registered as an Investment Company under the In-
vestment Company Act, 32 and the units of participation were regis-
tered as securities under the Securities Act of 1933. 33 
The Supreme Court framed the issues involved in Camp in terms 
of whether the operation of this type of investment fund involves a 
bank in "underwriting" the sale of "securities" under the Glass-
Steagall Act. 34 Although the terms "security" and "underwriter" 
had been interpreted in many different contexts under the se-
curities law, the court of appeals, in considering this same ques-
tion, had stated that the judicial gloss on these definitions in the 
securities acts could not be imported wholesale into the Glass-
Steagall Act because the laws serve different purposes. 35 The 
Supreme Court implicitly agreed with this position, in holding that 
the participations in the commingled investment account were 
_securities involving the bank in illegal underwriting relying, not 
31Ch. 6, § 11, 38 Stat. 262 (12 U.S.C. § 92a (1970)). 
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -52. (1970). Pursuant to its authority under 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) 
(1970), the SEC granted the account an exemption from 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l0 (1970) which 
permitted three members of the account's five member investment committee to be persons 
affiliated with Citibank. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASO) brought 
suit to challenge this exemption and this case was consolidated with Camp. The court of 
appeals upheld the validity of the exemption, National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 420 
F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969) [hereinafter cited as NASO v. SEC]. In reviewing the consolidated 
cases, the Supreme Court did not reach the Investment Company Act exemption issue, but 
vacated the NASO v. SEC opinion on the same grounds as the Camp case. 
33 15 U .S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Citibank was concededly a statutory 
underwriter under the Securities Act of 1933 for the units of participation issued. The 
defendants relied upon and the court of appeals accepted the "two entity" theory that the 
account is an entity separate from the bank. NASO v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1960). 
Therefore it did not enjoy the bank's exemption but was a nonexempt investment company 
and a nonexempt issuer of a security subject to regulation. Although the bank was an 
underwriter of a security under the definition of those terms in the Securities Act, it was not 
an underwriter within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act. 
34401 U.S. at 634-35. 
35420 F.2d 83, 89. The court of appeals' decision in Camp is reported under the name of its 
companion case. See note 32 supra. 
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upon the well-kn9wn line of decisions under the securities acts, 36 
but upon the purposes and policies of the Glass-Steagall Act. 37 
Considering ·the policies of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Court 
found three hazards in the sale of units of participation in a com-
mingled investment account that are not present when a bank, 
following traditional practices, undertakes to purchase stock for 
the account of its individual customers or to commingle assets that 
it has received as a fiduciary in a trust account. First, losses on a 
commingled investment account could endanger public confidence 
in the bank itself. Second, promotional incentives to market the 
units of participation aggressively make it impossible for the bank 
to give disinterested investment advice in its role as a fiduciary. 
Third, the managing of the account could tempt the bank to make 
unsound loans to customers for the purpose of participating in the 
account or to companies in whose stocks the account was in-
vested. 38 The Court interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act as permit-
ting banks to operate a collective investment fund for the invest-
ment of funds held for a "true fiduciary purpose," but as prohibit-
ing them from commingling assets which it has received for in-
vestment. 39 
Further analysis, however, reveals that none of the problems the 
Court cites are unique to commingled investment accounts as 
opposed to traditional agency or common trust funds. No special 
danger exists that losses on a commingled investment account 
would deplete bank depositors' money, because the securities pur-
chased are only for the account of participants in the fund. Neither 
is there any unique problem that portfolio losses would cause 
diminished public confidence in banks. Through their trust de-
partments, banks already hold significant stock positions in 
portfolio companies. The Patman Report of 1968 found that the 
forty-nine largest trust banks held more than 5 percent of the stock 
of 145 of the 500 largest industrial corporations, and that these 
holdings were often accompanied by director interlocks. 40 In some 
industries, such as the airlines industry, banks, through their trust 
departments, have been particularly dominant. 41 
The argument that special promotional incentives exist to market 
the fund that would interfere with the ability of banks to offer 
36The two leading Supreme Court cases on the definition of a security under the securities 
acts are still SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), and SEC v. W.J. 
Aowey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). For the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement, see 
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
37401 U.S. at 623-34. 
38/d. at 636-38. 
39/d. at 638. 
40STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE, HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CUR· 
RENCY, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., I COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRUST ACTIVITIES: 
EMERGING INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY Ch. 3 (Comm. Print. 1968). 
41/d. at 484-85. 
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disinterested financial advice is also not convincing. Banks have 
promoted their trust services aggressively, regarding them not only 
as directly profitable but also as sources of other loan and deposit 
business. 42 The possibility of distortion of loan policy is inherent in 
trust department activities and is a source of continuing concern. 43 
The Court's holding that a commingled investment fund involves 
a bank in underwriting a "security" under the Glass-Steagall Act 
thus cannot be supported by the distinction between the sale of 
fiduciary services and the sale of investments. But the Court ad-
vanced another reason for its holding. Conceding that the three 
powers that would be used in marketing the account-pooling trust 
assets, acting as managing agent for individual customers, and 
purchasing stock for the account of its customers-were within a 
banks' powers under the banking laws, the Court nevertheless 
found that "the union of these powers gives birth to an investment 
fund whose activities are of a different character. " 44 Thus, the 
Court reasoned, that because the investment fund created was 
indisputably in direct competition with the mutual fund industry, 
and because the selling of mutual fund shares is undeniably the 
issuance of a security, the bank investment fund must also be a 
security. 45 
The difficulty with this analysis is that the Court abandons the 
idea, which it had implicity accepted, that there may be a distinc-
tion between the ways the terms "security" and "1.mderwriting" 
are used in the Glass-Steagall Act and in the securities laws. By 
adopting the test of "direct competition" with mutual funds, the 
Court is judging the bank investment fund by the securities acts 
and investment company act standards. It had, of course, been 
. . 
conceded by the banks that their fund was a "security" under 
the Securities Act of 1933 and an "investment company" under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. 46 However, the Court ignores 
the possibility that an interest may be a security under the 1933 and 
1934 securities acts and the account may be an investment c9m-
pany, without involving the bank in the underwriting of a security 
under the Glass-Steagall Act. 47 Because of the breadth of the 
judicial holdings relating to the definition of a security under the 
42 E. HERMAN, supra note 27, at 16. 
43/d. at 16-17. 
44401 U.S. at 624-25. 
45/d. at 625. 
46See note 33 supra. 
47 Unlike the two securities acts, the Glass-Steagall Act does not define the term."se-
curity." 
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securities acts, the Glass-Steagall Act would become unworkable if 
these doctrines were imported into it wholesale. 48 
The use of the "direct competition" test nevertheless permeates 
the entire Supreme Court opinion in the Camp case. 49 The result is 
a compartmentalized view of the activities of commercial banks 
and other investment vehicles that does not comport with reality 
and that incorrectly interprets the Glass-Steagall Act as embodying 
a policy of prohibiting direct competition between banks and the 
investment company and securities industries. In addition, the test 
used for the definition of "security" and "underwriting" under the 
Glass-Steagall Act gives no firm guidance as to how lower courts 
and agencies such as the SEC should treat banks' securities-related 
activities in the future. The irony of the Court's opinion is that it 
substantially increases the difficulty of sorting out forays by banks 
into the investment and securities business. This has become clear 
in the aftermath of the Camp decision. 
II. THE AFfERMATH OF INVESTMENT COMPANY 
INSTITUTE V. CAMP 
A. Newer Forms of Bank Securities-Related 
Activllies 
Despite the Supreme Court's unwarranted view in Camp that the 
policy of the Glass-Steagall Act is to prohibit banks from direct 
competition with the investment company and securities indus-
tries, commercial banks have increased their securities-related ac-
tivities in the years since the decision. These activities can be 
divided into three general categories. First, banks offer their cus-
tomers many agency securities services in which they act as inter-
mediaries between the customer and the broker-dealer commun-
48The definition of a ''security'' under the securities laws has been construed to cover any 
instrument whose economic impact is the use of money of passive investors on the promise 
of profits. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 844 (1975). Thus, in 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), withdrawable capital shares in a state-chartered 
savings and loan association were held to be securities. Moreover, the definition has been 
construed to cover certain trust department activities of banks. Local 734 Trust v. Continen-
tal Ill. Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., (1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH),r 94, 
565 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); 
Carroll v. First Nat'! Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert', denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970). 
It has also been held applicable to revocable inter vivos trusts sold by a trust company where 
the trustee had unlimited investment discretion and the investor was assured a return. SEC 
V. Heritage Trust Co., (1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 95,282 
(W.D. Ariz. 1976). 
49401 U.S. ,\T 625, 635, 638. 
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ity .50 These services go beyond the traditional custodial account in 
which the customer deposits his portfolio for safekeeping and the 
bank distributes the dividends or buys and sells securities at the 
customer's direction. Many banks offer an individual portfolio 
management plan under which the customer instructs the bank to 
make purchases or sales of securities with the aid of recom-
mendations by the bank or a correspondent broker-dealer.51 Also 
available are dividend reinvestment plans under which the cus-
tomer may request a corporation to pay all his dividends to a bank 
which aggregates them and purchases additional shares of the 
corporation's common stock. 52 The newest type of agency se-
curities service is the automatic investment service (AIS) under 
which the bank deducts an amount from a bank customer's check-
ing account monthly and invests it in common stock of issuers 
selected by the customer from a list of the twenty-five largest 
corporations based upon the market value of outstanding stock. 
The bank pools the monthly deductions from each participant for 
the purpose of executing the transactions, but each month the 
customer receives a statement indicating the number of full and 
fractional shares purchased on his behalf. 53 
Second, banks are heavily engaged in securities activities 
through their offering of two different types of money-management 
collective investment funds. A common trust fund can be main-
tained for the investment of moneys managed by the bank in its 
capacity as trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian. Banks 
can also set up collective investment funds consisting solely of 
assets of retirement, pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other 
tax benefited plans.54 In addition, since 1972 banks have been 
50 Because the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits banks from acting as underwriters or dealers 
but permits agency securities activities, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970), it is arguable that banks could 
operate a retail brokerage business for customers. Banks have not chosen to test this 
proposition, however, presumably for economic reasons. 
5 'Commercial banks have typically offered these services to wealthy investors who can 
afford the minimum account, typically $200,000 or more. In recent years the minimum 
account size has been lowered to as little as $10,000. No pooling of the accounts takes place, 
and transactions are not executed by the bank without prior approval of the customer. 
Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 97 (written comments of the SEC). Banks 
generally do not accept discretionary investment accounts because of the securities law 
implications. See text accompanying note 88 infra. The Camp case, of course, prevents the 
commingling of these accounts. See note 39 and accompanying_ text supra. 
52These plans have enjoyed remarkable growth in the last five years. Securities Subcomm. 
Hearing, supra note 26, at 94. 
531n 1974, about twenty-five commercial banks offered an AIS plan. Id. at 96-97. 
54 12 C.F.R. § 9. 18 (1975). These collective funds are permitted even after Camp because of 
their fiduciary purpose. As of November, 1975, the nation's commercial banks were handl-
ing approximately $400 billion in trust assets. Of this, $150 billion represented pension funds 
and other assets of institutional customers; the remainder was being managed for private 
individuals. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ISSUES PAPER, supra note 26, at 7, reprinted in 
Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 3L 
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authorized to serve as investment advisors to both open end and 
closed end investment companies; they may even sponsor, or-
ganize, and control closed end investment companies. 55 
Third, banks offer corporate customers financial consulting ser-
vices. This involves complete analysis of long term financing ob-
jectives and alternatives. Where appropriate, they grant long or 
medium term loans, arrange a private placement of the corpora-
tion's securities, and assist in dealing with an investment banker to 
carry out a public offering. 56 In this area, banks are in direct 
competition with investment bankers despite the fact that the 
Glass-Steagall Act prohibits them from underwriting and dealing in 
securities except for United States Government bonds and general 
obligation bonds of state and local governments. 57 
B. The Counter-Attack of the Investment 
Company Industry 
The Investment Company Institute, the trade association of 
open end investment companies that was the plaintiff in Camp, has 
brought two separate actions in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief 
against two of the above-mentioned bank securities activities. In 
the first case, the Institute challenged, as an infringement of sec-
tions 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, that part of the Federal 
Reserve Board's Regulation Y which permits banks to act as in-
vestment advisors of mutual funds. 58 However, the action was 
dismissed on procedural grounds without resolution. 59 The second 
55 12 C.F.R. §§ 22f4(a), 225.125 (1976). In the opinion of the Federal Reserve Board, as 
expressed in the regulations, a bank which sponsors, organizes, or controls a mutual fund 
would violate the Glass-Steagall Act. Nonetheless, this is not true with respect to closed end 
investment companies, because, unlike mutual funds, they do not continuously issue and 
redeem their securities and are thus not primarily in the business of selling securities. 12 
C.F.R § 225.125(0 (1976). For a discussion of these problems see Comment, Bank Spon-
sored Investment Services: Statutory Proscriptions, Jurisdictional Conflicts, and a Legisla-
tive Proposal, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 726, 789-92 (1975). 
56DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ISSUES PAPER, supra note 26, at 9, reprinted in Securities 
Sucbomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 33. See also Bus. WEEK, supra note 8, at 54-55. 
57See notes 15-22 and accompanying text supra. There is a separate debate over the 
question of whether banks' underwriting powers should be broadened to include municipal 
revenue bonds, which can be repaid only from specific revenues. Attempts by banks to enter 
this field have been struck down by the courts. See Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. 
Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966), affd sub. nom., Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 
F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968). For an argument that legislation should be enacted granting this 
power to banks, see Mehle, Bank Underwriting of Municipal Revenue Bonds: Presen•ing 
Free and Fair Competition, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117 (1975). 
58See note 55 supra. 
59 ICI v. Board of Governors, No. 74-697 (D.D.C. filed May 8, 1974), dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction (July 30, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-1822 (D.C. Cir. Aug. I, 1975). For the 
text of the complaint, see [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 94,540 
(D.D.C. May 8, 1974). 
12 Journal of Law Reform [VOL 10:1 
case, New York Stock Exchange & Investment Co. Institute v. 
Smith, 60 involved a challenge to the ruling of the Comptroller of the 
Currency that AIS services offered by national banks do not vio-
late the Glass-Steagall Act. 61 The district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendant, holding that selling units of participa-
tion in the AIS plan does not constitute selling a security by an 
affiliate under the Glass-Steagall Act, and that the underlying se-
curities transactions by banks are within the agency exception of 
section 16.62 The court distinguished Camp on the grounds that the 
AIS offering does not create in the banks a salesman's interest in 
the performance of the securities or threaten the bank's prestige 
because they do not •·•manage" the customer's investments. The 
banks' lending policies would not be affected because the corpora-
tions whose securities were involved are all "blue chip" com-
panies and are solvent by definition. The court also found that 
under an AIS, banks compete with investment brokers "only in 
terms of convenience, cost and dependability" and that this pre-
sents no danger to bank solvency. 63 
This analysis shows the difficulty of applying the Camp ap-
proach to the ever-changing kaleidoscope of new activities by 
banks in this field. The courts are faced with judging each form of 
securities-related activity on a case-by-case basis against the 
policies of the Glass-Steagall Act. Furthermore, the result in Smith 
is difficult to reconcile with the Camp decision. AIS plans are in 
direct competition with similar plans provided by the investment 
company industry, 64 and banks pool participants' funds for the 
purpose of executing securities transactions just as in other in-
vestment funds. Yet the court ignored the Supreme Court's "direct 
competition" test and disregarded the commingling of funds in a 
nonfiduciary account. It is also difficult to accept the court's view 
that a bank is totally indifferent to the performance of the twenty-
five securities it selects for the plan. The court's narrow view of the 
policy of the Glass-Steagall Act is quite subjective, and this ad hoc 
approach to the resolution of the problem of what bank securities 
activities are permissible is undesirable because it can only lead to 
confusion and conflicting interpretations. 
60404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975). The complaint is reprinted in [1974-1975 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 'ii 94,798 (D.D.C. 1975). 
61 This ruling was contained in a letter, dated June 10, 1974, from the Comptroller of the 
Currency to the attorney for the Investment Company Institute. For the relevant text, see 
Glass-Steagall Act-A History of Its Legislative Origin and Regulatory Construction, 92 
BANKING L.J. 38 (1975). 
62404 F. Supp. at 1097. 
63/d. at 1099-1100. 
64Securities Subcomm_. Hearings,. supra note 26, at 100 (written comments of the SEC). 
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C. The Regulatory Response 
I. The Bank Supervisory Agencies-Bank supervisory agencies 
regulate and monitor bank fiduciary activities, including the tradi-
tional and newer forms of securities-related activities, through the 
bank examination process. Because the national banks are most 
active in this area, the primary regulatory responsibility falls on the 
Comptroller of the Currency. 65 Applicable rules require an annual 
trust department examination separate from the general bank ex-
amination.66 Investments must be examined to determine whether 
they are in accordance with law and sound fiduciary principles. 67 
The assets of each fiduciary account are required to be segregated 
from the assets of the bank and either kept separate from those of 
other accounts or otherwise adequately identified. 68 
Bank supervisory agencies argue that the bank examination pro-
cess can be adapted to provide adequate regulation of bank se-
curities activities, 69 but there are several difficulties with this 
proposition. First, there are substantial doubts whether trust de-
partment supervision has been adequate even with respect to tradi-
tional trust department investment activities, especially in the 
areas of conflicts of interest, disclosure, and cash management. 70 
Second, the Comptroller of the Currency, during the last decade, 
has been in the forefront of advocating increased bank power to 
engage in securities activities. In view of the "sense of consti-
tuency"71 of this and other bank regulatory agencies, it is doubtful 
whether effective regulation by them is possible. Third, even if the 
trust department supervision process is adequate for its purpose, 
which is to assure that breaches of fiduciary duty will not endanger 
the bank's solvency, this process does not seem well-suited to the 
purpose of protecting investors. Furthermore, disclosure, the tra-
65 All national banks are examined by the Comptroller of the Currency, while state 
chartered banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System are examined by the 
Federal Reserve Board. Federally insured state chartered banks are examined by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and noninsured banks are left to state regulatory 
authorities. 
66Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 176 (letter of Comptroller of the 
Currency to Subcomm. Chairman, Feb. 3, 1976). 
67 12 C.F.R. § 9.ll(a) (1976). 
68 12 C.F.R. § 9.13 (1976). 
69Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 168-70 (statement of the Comptroller 
of the Currency). However, the Comptroller's Office leaves audit procedures of the newer 
forms of bank securities activities, such as AIS, to the discretion of the individual examiner. 
There is also no special scrutiny of bank investment advisor activities. Id. at 176. For a 
defense of the adequacy of agency supervision over bank securities activities, see Comment, 
The Legality of Bank-Sponsored Investment Services, 84 YALE L.J. 1477, 1498-1504 (1975). 
10See Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Investment Activities, 82 YALE 
L.J. 977 (I 973). 
71The phrase is Professor Gerard T. Dumme's. Editor's Headnotes, 93 BANKING L.J. 387 
(1976). 
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ditional tool for protecting investors and safeguarding the alloca-
tive efficiency of the securities markets, is distrusted by the bank-
ing agencies. 72 Fourth, insofar as banks are effectively competing 
with investment companies and securities dealers through the 
evolving forms of bank securities activities, it seems unfair to 
subject the banks to substantially different regulatory require-
ments, because this skews the competition between them. 
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission:._The SEC, which 
exercises regulatory jurisdiction over the securities and investment 
company industries, has been unsure and inconsistent in its ap-
proach to the regulation of bank securities activities. Banks are 
clearly subject to the antifraud provisions of the securities acts, 73 
even with regard to transactions on behalf of their traditional trust 
and custodial accounts. 74 The problem presented to the SEC in the 
face of increasing bank securities activities is that the securities 
laws contain broad exemptions for banks from the registration 
requirements which are applicable to most other participants in the 
securities markets. The Securities Act of 1933 exempts securities 
issued or guaranteed by banks as well as participations in common 
trust funds and most tax benefited single or collective trust funds. 75 
The Securities Exchange Act exempts banks from the definitions 
of "broker" and "dealer" 76 providing that the continuous report-
ing and proxy solicitation requirements applicable to banks are to 
be administered by the appropriate federal bank regulatory agen-
72See note 6 supra. 
73The principal antifraud provisions are, of course, section IO(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) and Rule IOb-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 
IOb-5 (1976). Also relevant is 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), which is the general antifraud provision 
under the 1933 Securities Act. 
74See cases cited in note 48 supra. In a significant recent decision, a federal district court 
held a nonvoluntary, noncontributory employee pension plan to be a "security" subject to 
the federal securities laws, including the antifraud provisions. Daniel v. International Bhd. 
of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541 (N .D. Ill. 1976). 
75 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970). This exemption applies to the registration requirements of 
the 1933 Securities Act but does not extend to the antifraud sections. Moreover, the 
exemption is not available if the plan provides that contributions are to be held in a single 
trust fund maintained by a bank for a single employer and an .amount in excess of the 
employer's contribution is allocated to securities issued by the employer. The exemption is 
also not available to plans which cover self-employed individuals (H.R. 10 plans) within the 
meaning of section 40l(c)(l) of the Internal Revenue Code, although the SEC can exempt 
them by rule. Id. In addition, the SEC has interpreted the exemption to be unavailable 
where a trustee bank acts as a mere custodian for a collective trust fund and does not have 
investment discretion. In re Sterling Bank & Trust Co., [1976] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1) 
80,433. 
76 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4), (5) (1970). An important aspect of this exemption with respect to 
newer forms of bank securities activities is that banks are not subject to any specific 
"suitability" requirement which bars brokers from recommending securities unsuitable for 
their customers. See Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 163 (response of 
SEC). The Chairman of the SEC has recently stated that the SEC is considering whether to 
interpret existing law to require that banks assure the suitability as investments of the 
securities they purchase for customers. SEC Mulls Regulating Investment Plans of Banks 
Competing with Broker Firms, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1976, at 2, col. 4. 
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cies77 and including common trust fund interests and most tax 
benefited plans in the definition of "exempted security. " 78 In 
addition, the Investment Company Act of 1940 excludes banks, 
trust companies, and common trust funds from the definition of 
"investment company, " 79 and banks are not "investment ad-
visors" as that term is defined under the Investment Advisors Act 
of 1940.80 
The debate over the wisdom of these broad exclusions for banks 
in the federal securities laws should focus on three separate issues: 
(l) whether the bank supervisory agencies are capable of 
adequately regulating disclosure on the issuance of new bank se-
curities as well as the continuous reporting disclosure require-
ments, 81 (2) whether additional disclosure should be required of 
bank trust department activities, particularly with respect to pen-
sion and other collective investment funds, 82 and (3) whether the 
other exemptions, such as the exclusion from the definitions of 
broker-dealer, investment company, and investment advisor, are 
now outmoded because of the newer forms of bank securities-
related activities. 
The first question has not yet been directly faced by the SEC, 
and is a source of continuing controversy. 83 The second question is 
the subject of an ongoing SEC study, 84 but any increased disclo-
sure requirements are certain to be opposed by bank regulators. 
The solution adopted by the SEC in response to the third question 
is the "two entity" theory which holds that when a bank creates an 
investment plan or fund going beyond any of the express exemp-
tions of the acts, it has created a separate nonexempt entity that is 
engaged in the issuance of securities. This entity is subject to 
regulation because the account or fund is the issuer, rather than the 
77 15 u.s.c. § 781(i) (1970). 
78 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l2) (1970). This has the effect of an exemption from all of the 
requirements of the Act except the antifraud provisions. Single and collective trust funds 
maintained by a bank for self-employed individuals (H.R. 10 plans) are not included in the 
definition of exempted security, but are specifically exempt from the registration provisions 
of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(H) (1970). 
79 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3), (11) (1970). 
80 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (1970). However, banks that are advisors for registered invest-
ment companies are not exempt from the provisions of the Investment Company Act that 
pertain to investment advisors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (1970). 
81 Under their general power of supervision over banks, the bank supervisory agencies 
adopted disclosure requirements for offering circulars of new issues of bank securities, 
analogous to 1933 Securities Act regulation. See 12 C.F.R. § 16.1-.6 (1976). New issues by 
bank holding companies are subject to SEC jurisdiction. 
-
82 For a review of current proposals in this area, ~ee Lybecker, supra note 70, at 998-1001. 
83See, e.g., Mann, supra note 6; Butera, Bank Exemption from the 1933 Securities Act, 93 
BANKING L.J. 432 (1976). 
84See SEC Swdies Easing of Mwual Fund Reins, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1976, at 2, col. 3. 
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bank, which is exempt. 85 This was the theory applied by the SEC 
to the commingled fund in Camp. 86 The decision of the Supreme 
Court, however, left open for definitive resolution the question of 
the viability of the "two entity" approach, and did not provide the 
SEC with any guidance on how the securities acts are to be applied 
to the other newer forms of bank securities activities. 87 
As a result, the SEC has taken a tentative approach to regulation 
in this area. In 1970, before Camp, the SEC asserted its regulatory 
authority over a proposal by First National City Bank (Citibank) to 
create a special investment advisory service for individual inves-
tors who would invest at least $25,000. Under the plan, the investor 
gave Citibank discretion through power of attorney to place orders 
for his account with Merrill Lynch, which kept custody of the 
securities invested for the participating accounts. Despite the fact 
that the investment advisory service was represented as an indi-
vidual portfolio management service, the SEC brought an action 
for injunctive relief. The theory, an application of the ''two entity" 
approach, was that the substantial parallelism in investing showed 
that in reality the special investment advisory service was itself an 
investment company, and that the units of participation were se-
curities subject to registration under the federal securities laws. 
Citibank entered into a consent decree and abandoned the service 
without admitting or denying the validity of the SEC's position. 88 
Despite this initial assertion of authority, in the years since 
Camp the SEC has largely avoided direct regulation, not only of 
individual portfolio management services, but also of AIS plans 
and dividend reinvestment plans. In 1973, the SEC issued a "no 
action" letter regarding an AIS plan where the participants had 
ownership rights over the securities. 89 In another release, the SEC 
set out participant ownership criteria for exemption of dividend 
reinvestment plans from registration.90 However, the SEC has 
85 See · note 33 supra. This theory was first developed by the SEC in connection with 
investment fund activities of insurance companies. See Prudential Ins. Co., 41 S.E.C. 335 
(1963), affd, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S-. 953 (1964). 
86See note 33 supra. . 
81See Address by SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. before the National Trust Conference, 
Feb. 4, 1974, rptd. at [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 79,641. 
88SEC v. First Nat'! City Bank, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH),I 
92,592 (S.D. N.Y. Feb. 6, 1970). Subsequent to this, the SEC staff agreed to permit Citibank 
to offer its small account portfolio management service without registration as long as the 
bank exercises no investment discretion. Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 
198 (staff study outline). In 1974, the SEC announced that it would publish guidelines on the 
problems raised by these services. Sec. Act Rel. No. 5491, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder) FED. 
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 79,767 (Apr. 30, 1974). Nonetheless, no further position has been 
taken by the SEC. 
89 lnvestment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 79,41 I. 
••see Lucky Stores, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH),I 79,903. 
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announced its refusal to issue additional "no action" letters91 and, 
not surprisingly, has taken the position that the general antifraud 
provisions of the securities acts are applicable to these interests. 92 
The SEC has also demonstrated caution in its approach to regu-
lation of newer forms of collective trusts maintained by banks in 
connection with retirement and profit-sharing plans. House Resolu-
tion IO (Keogh) plans, established by Congress to allow self-
employed individuals to establish tax-qualified retirement plans,93 
are exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 193494 and the Investment Company Act of 
1940,95 but are subject to registration under the Securities. Act of 
1933, unless the SEC determines that exemption of such interests 
would be appropriate. 96 The SEC has.not yet formulated a general 
policy for these plans and has issued "no action" letters on an ad 
hoc basis. Most banks establishing such plans, however, are rely-
ing on the intrastate offering exemption of section 3(a)(l l) of the 
1933 Act97 to avoid registration. 98 
The SEC has also failed to provide effective protection for indi-
vidual retirement accounts (IRA's), which can be offered by banks 
under section 2OO2(b) of the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974.99 IRA's and collective investment funds for 
IRA's are not exempt under either section 3(c)(l 1) of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940100 or section 3(a)(2) of the Securities 
Act of 1933101 because they are not trusts as described under 
section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. Despite this, the SEC 
has issued "no action" letters to banks stating that registration will 
not be required under either act if the IRA participants direct 
investment of their assets into individual bank savings accounts or 
if the plans are funded by mutual fund shares or exempted se-
curities.102 The SEC has thus chosen to ignore the "two entity" 
approach in this area. 
91 Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 152 (response of SEC). 
92 lnvestment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 79,411. 
93 Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809(Oct. 10, 1962), amending section 401(c) of the Internal 
Revenue Code .. 
94See note 78 supra. 
95See note 79 supra. 
96See note 75 supra. 
97 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(II) (1970). 
98Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 161 (response of the SEC). 
9929 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1381 (1975). Section 2002(b) added section 408 to the Internal 
Revenue Code, creating a new form of tax sheltered retirement medium for individuals not 
covered by qualified or governmental pension plans or tax sheltered annuities. 26 U.S.C. § 
408 (Supp. V 1975). 
100 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(I I) (1970). 
101 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970). 
102Investment Co. Institute, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH.) ,i 
80,018 (1974); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,I 80,411. 
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In addition, the SEC has hesitated to assert any authority over 
other securities-related powers which banks have assumed in the 
last several years. Banks offer investment advisory services not 
only to corporate pension and profit-sharing plans qualified under 
section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, but also to investment 
companies and real estate investment trusts. The exclusion of 
banks and bank holding companies from the definition of "invest-
ment adviser" under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940103 
exempts them from regulation under that act, and the SEC has not 
attempted to use the "two entity" theory to extend regulation to 
these new forms of advisory activities. 104 Bank underwriting ac-
tivities are subject only to the antifraud provisions of the securities 
laws despite the recent expansion of this type of activity .105 The 
SEC has only been given authority to study106 the exemption of 
banks from the definition of broker and dealer, 107 although, under 
the Securities Act Amendments of 1975, the municipal securities 
activities of banks are now subject to regulation, and dealer banks 
or their separately identifiable departments are required to register 
as "municipal securities dealers." 108 
D. A Summary View of the Impact 
of the Camp Decision 
The events of the past five years show that Camp has had an 
unexpected impact. The Supreme Court's attempt to breathe new 
life into the Glass-Steagall Act and to restrict bank securities ac-
tivities has been a well-intentioned failure unnecessarily complica-
ting the search for solutions to the problems they present. The 
unsupportable distinction, between banks' collective management 
of funds held for a fiduciary purpose and those funds received for 
an investment purpose, has become embedded in the Glass-
Steagall Act. An inefficient case-by-case adjudication process is 
being used to test newer forms of bank securities activities against 
the Glass-Steagall Act limitations:Having been given no guidance 
as to the extent of its regulatory jurisdiction and the validity of the 
103 15 U .S.C. § 8Ob-2(a)(I I) (1970). 
10•1n theory the use of the "two entity" approach is possible be~ause nonba~k s~b-
sidiaries of banks and bank holding companies are not exempt. In its recent leg1slat1ve 
proposals on the Investment Advisers Act, the SEC merely asked for authority to study the 
possibility of eliminating the bank exclusion. See Investment Advisers Act Release No. 491, 
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 80,341. 
105See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra. 
•06Securities · Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 7(c), 89 Stat. 111 (to be 
codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(e}). 
107See note 76 and accompanying text supra. . 
• 08 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §,3, 89 Stat. 97 (to be codified 
in 15 U.S.C. § 78c(3O)). 
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"two entity" theory, the SEC has understandably vacillated in 
asserting regulatory authority in this area. A definitive solution to 
these problems, which can come only from Congress, has been 
delayed by the Camp decision because of unnecessary confusion 
as to the real issues involved: the continuing validity of the policies 
of separation enacted in 1933 through the Glass-Steagall Act, and 
the extent to which the SEC, as opposed to the bank supervisory 
agencies, should be given regulatory jurisdiction in this area. 
III. REEXAMINATION OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT 
RESTRICTIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE SEC IN 
CONTEXT: THE REFORM OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
A. The Narrow Scope of the Response in Congress 
The increasing number and variety of bank securities activities 
have caused Congress to begin a review of the Glass-Steagall Act 
restrictions on bank's and the need for additional regulation. The 
congressional study is being conducted by the Subcommittee ori 
Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs (the Williams Subcommittee). 109 No definitive solu-
tion has yet been advanced, but the subcommittee has published a 
"study outline" 110 setting out the scope of its review and has held 
hearings on the issues involved. The inqui_ry is focusing upon the 
exploration of public policy questions underlying the entry of 
commercial banks into the securities field without a broad reexam-
ination of the basic limitations and underlying policy of the Glass-
Steagall Act. 111 Most of the policy issues have been developed 
through the competing arguments of the two principal antagonists 
involved-the commercial banking and the securities-investment 
company industries. 
The methodology of the study is to weigh each newer form of 
bank securities activity against several competing policy consider-
ations. On the one hand, the banking industry argues that permit-
ting broad bank securities activities will benefit the consumer, the 
capital markets, and the economy. The consumer would benefit 
from increased competition with the investment company industry, 
109The chainnan of this subcommittee is Harrison A. Williams, Jr. In addition, separate 
studies of this same problem are being conducted by the SEC and the Department of the 
Treasury. See Sec, Act. Rel. No. 5491, supra note 88; DEP0T OF THE TREASURY ISSUES 
PAPER, supra note 26. 
110suecOMM. ON SECURITIES, SENATE COMM. "oN BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN 
AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., !ST SESS. THE SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS, 
STUDY OUTLINE (Comm. Print 1975). 
"'Id. at iv (introduction by Senator Williams). 
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and banks would be able to provide small investors with the finan-
cial money management services that are now available only to 
large entities through economies of scale from pooling. 112 Allowing 
bank competition in the underwriting of government revenue 
bonds would drive down prices for this service.11 3 The expansion 
of banks' securities services would also increase total investment 
in the securities markets, would provide financial benefits for the 
brokerage community executing the transactions on behalf of 
banks, and would increase liquidity .11 4 Conflicts of interest and 
unequal regulation could be ameliorated through increased reg-
ulatory powers granted particularly to the bank supervisory agen-
cies. Bank supervision and disclosure would be adequate to pre-
vent both financial difficulties and concentration of economic 
power. Because banking is already highly competitive, the regional 
banks would enjoy the greater portion of any growth of power 
involved. 115 
On the other hand, the investment company and securities indus-
tries emphasize competing policy considerations. They argue that 
banks enjoy freedom from regulation 116 because the bank super-
visory agencies are largely captives of the banking industry, 117 and 
that the competition from bank securities activities is unfair be-
cause banks use their economic power and relationships with cus-
tomers to gain securities business.U 8 They foresee failures of in-
vestment banking and securities firms, concentration of economic 
power, and a further institutionalization of the securities markets, 
all exacerbating the trend toward creation of a ''two tier'' market in 
which stocks of larger companies trade at higher multiples of 
earnings than do stocks of smaller companies. 119 They contend 
that regulation will not prevent conflicts of interest, and that banks 
will be tempted to skew their loan policies in favor of portfolio 
companies. 120 They also fear that regulation will not prevent banks 
from making profits on the "float" -uninvested customer cash 
112Set Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 283-85.(statement of Ray F. 
Myers on behalf of the American Bankers Association). 
113/d. at 285-86. 
114/d. at 342-44 (testimony of Charles W. Buek, Chairman of the Board, United States 
Trust Company). 
115/d. at 338-39 (Buek's testimony), 288-90 (Myers' statement). 
116/d. at 308-12, 316. 
117/d. at 307. 
118/d. at 313-16 (statement of Robert L. Augenblick on behalf of the Investment Company 
Institute). 
119/d. at 318. 
120/d. at 263-68 (written statement of the Securities Industry Association). 
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that is deposited in noninterest bearing accounts with the commer-
cial side of the bank. 121 
By posing the issues in this narrow framework, the Williams 
Subcommittee and the supervisory agencies have obviously· be-
come embroiled in an unanswerable dilemma. Their deliberations 
are circumscribed by the competing, self-interested arguments of 
two hostile interest groups. This type of study with the issues 
framed as narrowly as they are can only produce a small-minded 
legislative compromise permitting a modicum of bank securities 
activity coupled with increased regulation by the SEC and the bank 
supervisory agencies. 
Instead of refusing to reconsider the line of separation drawn by 
the Glass-Steagall Act between banks and investment banking and 
defining the issues narrowly in terms of whether the newer forms of 
bank securities activities should be permitted, the primary focus 
should be on a reexamination of the policy basis of the Glass-
Steagall Act separation and the validity of the Supreme Court's 
analysis in Camp. Another important emphasis should be in con-
sidering how to deal with bank securities activities in the context of 
the need for reform of financial institutions. 
B. The Basis of a Solution: the Separation 
of Trust Departments from Commercial Banks 
The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in 1933 in response to 
specific abuses that contributed to the collapse of the banking 
system subsequent to the 1929 stock market crash. 122 At that time 
banks were heavily engaged through affiliates in underwriting and 
dealing in securities. Senator Carter Glass and his subcommittee 
documented the dangers of bank involvement in the trading and 
ownership of securities. Banks unwisely loaned money to their 
securities affiliates, made loans to investors so they could purchase 
stock from affiliates, and offered loans to portfolio companies as 
well as to corporations that agreed to use bank affiliates as under-
writers. Larger banks pressured regional correspondent banks to 
promote their securities business, and affiliates were used to man-
ipulate the bank's own stock and to hide bad bank investments by 
shifting them to affiliates. 123 Underlying the legislative solution of 
121 /d. at 320 (statement of Robert L. Augenblick). 
' 22See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra. 
123Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 71, supra note 12, at 1064. 
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restrictions on bank securities activ1ties was the conviction of 
Senator Glass that intensive participation by banks in the securities 
markets, especially through the use of their depositary assets, 
exaggerates financial and business fluctuations, ultimately under-
mining the stability of the economic organization of the country .124 
However, the problems of 1933 have. given way to newer con-
cerns not present at that time. The most important of these is the 
economic power of bank trust departments. The Glass-Steagall Act 
did not disturb the established trust department activities of banks 
as a point of contact with the securities markets because trust 
department structure and policy was characterized by the personal 
trust function involving a large number of relatively small personal 
trust accounts, each of which had to be given individual attention. 
Conservative investment policies emphasized avoidance of risk 
and preservation of the principal. 125 
Although this still accurately describes many bank trust depart-
ments, large commercial banks have in recent years established 
trust departments managing billions of dollars in collective 
employee benefit and advisory trust accounts. There are tax and 
other incentives to invest these funds in the stock market, and 
preoccupation with performance has caused increasing use of 
high-risk, high-gain securities investment opportunities. 126 At the 
end of 1974, bank trust department holdings of securities amounted 
to $328 billion, and recent estimates state that this has grown to 
over $400 billion. 127 Most of this economic power is concentrated 
in a few commercial banks. At the end of 1972, of the 3,804 bank 
trust departments, only 71 had trust assets of $1 billion or more, 
and 1.9 percent of bank trustees managed $292 billion in trust 
assets. By contrast, 3,051 banks had trust assets of under $25 
million. 128 
Numerous abuses have been shown to surround the operation of 
large bank trust departments. Foremost among these are problems 
of conflicts of interest, such as communications of inside informa-
tion between a bank's commercial department and its trust de-
124/d. at 1001. 
125See E. HERMAN, supra note 27, at 21-23. 
126See id. at 23-24. State trust law concepts of the "prudent man" and even the federal 
fiduciary standard established by section 1104(a)( I )(A) of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(l)(A) (1975) have been inadequate for imposing 
substantive investment restrictions in the area of employee benefit plans. See Herbert, 
Investment Regulation and Conflicts of Interest in Employer-Managed Pension Plans, 17 
a.c. INous. & CoM. L. REv. 127, 144-46, 156-58 (1976). Higher than expected returns from 
a tax qualified pension plan directly benefit the employer, either through reduction of his 
costs or direct recovery of the "surplus" upon termination of the plan. Id. at 152-53. 
'
27See note 26 supra. 
128E. HERMAN, supra note 27, at 21. 
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partment. 129 There are indications that the conventional solution of 
establishing a "Chinese wall" between the two departments has 
not been effective. 13° Furthermore, larger trust departments regu-
larly deposit so-called "uninvestible funds" from their trust de-
partments in noninterest bearing accounts with the banks' com-
mercial departments, turning net operating losses on trust depart-
ment activities into substantial profits. 131 Large banks' trust ac-
tivities also present problems of potential bank influence on or 
control of portfolio companies, misuse of trust department re-
sources to service the demands of commercial customers, possible 
consideration of commercial customers' reactions to trust depart-
ment decisions to buy or sell securities, and bank control of proxy 
voting. 132 
These problems appear to be insoluble without major structural 
chariges. In 1973, a staff report by the House Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency proposed a complete separation from commercial 
banks of all trust departments with trust assets in excess of $200 
million. 133 This solution has been echoed by at least one former 
member of the Federal Reserve Board. 134 The proposal has appeal 
not only because it would ameliorate the problems of large com-
mercial banks and their trust departments; it would also provide 
12•:See generally Herman & Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the 
"Wall," 14 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 21 (1972); Lybecker, Regulation of Ban.k Trust 
Department Investment Activities: Seven Gaps; Eight Remedies (pt. I), 2 SEC. REG. L.J. 
122 (1974); E. HERMAN, supra note 27. 
'
3 0'fhe "Chinese wall" is· the solution proposed by the Hunt Commission, supra note 3. It 
relies on a body of rules and procedures adopted by the bank to regulate the flow of 
information between its trust and commercial departments. For criticism of the "wall" 
solution, see Herman & Safanda, supra note 129; Lybecker, supra note 70, at 983-84; 
Verkuil, Perspectives on Reform of Financial Institutions, 83 YALE L.J. 1349, 1372 (1974). 
However, the wall seems to pose an unresolvable dilemma in the case where a bank comes 
into possession of inside information about a 'corporation as a result of its commercial 
banking activities and the trust department is trading or recommending the corporation's 
securities. If the "wall" prevents the transmission of information, the bank may be held 
liable for the trust department's ignoring the information in the possession of the commercial 
side of the business. See Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH),I 94,329 (S.D. N.Y., Jan. 2, 1974), remanded without resolution 
for further factual findings, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974). 
131 1n 1974, the ten largest trust departments in New York City had an aggregate operating 
loss of $40.5 million, but this became a net profit of $141. 7 million after they received credit 
for trust department funds which had been deposited with their credit departments. Se-· 
curities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 147 (statement of Roderick M. Hills, 
Chairman of the SEC). See also Lybecker, supra note 129, at 138-43. 
132 E.· HERMAN, supra note 27, at 30-72. Preliminary indications are that problems of 
disclosure, substantive controls on investment, and prevention of conflicts of interest are 
not adequately addressed in the new Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. See 
Herbert, supra note 126, at 166-67. 
133STAFF OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE, COMM. ON BANKING AND 
CURRENCY, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., FINANCIAL INSTUTUTIONS: REFORM AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 98-101 (Comm. Print 1973). To be most effective, a totaf separation of trust and 
commercial activities into unaffiliated entities should be required. 
134Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 9-10 (testimony of Jeffrey M. 
Bucher). 
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the cornerstone for a solution to the overall problem of banks' 
securities activities in the context of reform of financial institu-
tions. 
If this separation were a part of the line of demarcation drawn by 
the Glass-Steagall Act, the resulting trust companies could be 
allowed, under appropriate regulatory constraints, to extend their 
securities-related activities and to enter freely into competition 
with the investment company and securities industries by offering 
commingled investment accounts·, investment advice, and even 
· underwriting services. Consumers and small investors would ben-
efit from increased competition and would gain the benefit of 
money management services that have long been available to weal-
thy investors. The dangers of market domination would be re-
moved, and equality of opportunity in the marketplace would be 
achieved through severance of the connection of trust departments 
with commercial banking. It has been predicted that many large 
trust departments would fail without the benefit of their tie to 
commercial banks,135 but this does not take into account the in-
creased economic opportunities they would have by permitting 
them to engage broadly in securities activities. Furthermore, if the 
present structure of trust fees is so low that bank trust departments 
are unprofitable, it must mean that trust department customers are 
not paying the true marginal costs of service but are receiving 
subsidies from commercial banking customers. Continuation of 
this inequity cannot be a good argument against separation. 136 
C. The Dispute Over Regulatory Jurisdiction 
Separating trust departments from commercial banks would also 
be the basis for resolving the problem of regulatory jurisdiction 
between the SEC and the bank supervisory agencies. The present 
situation, without separation, presents an insoluble regulatory 
puzzle. While the SEC, in carrying out its mission of protecting 
investors, seeks increased disclosure from banks of their trust 
135Lybecker, supra note 70, at 1001. 
136Verkuil, supra note 130, at 1371-72. Moreover, allowing trust companies to compete 
freely with investment companies and securities firms should be accompanied by measures 
to allow mutual fund complexes, insurance companies, and brokerage and investment 
advisory firms to compete for the employee pension fund business. Tax law restrictions 
preventing these entities from serving as trustees or custodians for qualified retirement 
funds should be eliminated. Under § 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, brokerage and· 
investment companies, investment advisors, and insurance companies are not permitted to 
be trustees or custodians of qualified retirement funds. However, the Employment Income 
Securities Act of 1974 amended § 401(f) of the I.R.C. to permit persons other than banks, 
upon designation by the Secretary of the Treasury-, to be appointed trustee for § 403(b) 
custodial accounts and for§ 408(a) Individual Retirement Accounts. 26 U.S.C. § 40I(f)(2) 
(Supp. V 1975). 
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department activities, the bank supervisory agencies, whose task is 
primarily to safeguard the financial solvency of banks, view disclo-
sure as causing needless concern over the financial stability of 
major banks. 137 The banking agencies thus are resisting the SEC's 
assertion of jurisdiction over banks' trust department activities. 
This regulatory conflict would be reduced by separation,.giving the 
SEC the authority to subject the new trust companies to the same 
disclosure and substantive regulatory requirements as other vehi-
cles for pooled investment without conflicting or overlapping with 
the jurisdiction of bank supervisory agencies. 
Disclosure to investor-participants in the various types of trust 
department collective investment funds is beginning to be recog-
nized as a major problem. Concern is especially acute with regard 
to employer-funded pension plans. In the recent case of Daniel v. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 138 the court denied a 
motion to dismiss an action brought by an employee under section 
lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and 
section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act against the trustees of a 
union-managed pension fund. The court not only found an interest 
in a pension fund to be a "security," but also held that the transfer 
of the interest was a "sale" 139 under the securities laws despite the 
fact that the pension fund was both "involuntary" and "non-
contributory" in the sense that it was funded solely by employer 
contributions and that participants came under the plan automati-
cally by reason of their employment without any choice on their 
part. In coming to this conclusion, the court rejected the long 
established SEC position that there is no sale in the absence of 
individual choice or contribution, 140 finding that this position 
"comports neither to logic nor economic reality. " 141 More signifi-
cantly, the court also considered whether, as a matter of policy, 
there was a need for disclosure in view of the significant body of 
special legislation enacted by Congress to govern pension fund 
management. It found a need for disclosure under the securities 
laws because of the more limited purpose of the pension legisla-
tion. "It is significant to note that this entire body of pension 
legislation is concerned with administration of such funds, so as to 
protect the interests of its participants, rather than regulation of 
circumstances of entry into the plan." 142 
137See note 6 supra. 
138[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 95,453 (N.0. Ill., Mar. I, 
1976). 
139The term "sale" is defined as a "disposition ofa security ... for value." 15 U.S.C. § 
77b(3) (1970). 
140See Opinion of the Assistant General Counsel of the SEC, [1941] FED. SEc. L. REP. 
(CCH) 11 2105.50 
141Daniel, supra note 138, at 99,297. 
'
42/d. at 99,294. 
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Although this case involved a union-managed pension fund, its 
significance extends to trust department collective investment veh-
icles as well. Daniel not only confirms the possibility of IOb-5 
liability, but also indicates the need for giving adequate information 
to potential participants at the time of entry into the fund. At this 
point the bank examination process is no substitute for disclosure. 
Disclosing adequate information should be accomplished, not by 
relying on the general antifraud provisions of the securities laws, 
but by subjecting trust department collective investment vehicles 
and securities activities to the same SEC regulations that apply to 
similar activities of the investment company and securities indus-
try. 
D. The Relation to Reform of Financial Institutions 
Separation of trust departments from large commercial banks as 
a solution to problems of bank securities activities is also consis-
tent with recent proposals for reform of financial institutions. The 
same considerations supporting the reform movement directed to-
ward removing barriers to competition between banks and thrift 
institutions in the area of commercial banking in order to assure a 
more stable supply of credit143 indicate that the consuming public 
would also benefit from more competition in the area of collective 
trust funds and pooled investment opportunities. Just as separation 
of large trust departments from commercial banks is necessary to 
assure competitive equality in the marketplace between thrift in-
stitutions and commercial banks, 144 separation is also necessary 
for effective competition in the collective investment fund and 
pension fund area. Moreover, the removal of bank supervisory 
agencies from regulatory responsibility for banks' collective in-
vestment funds should simplify the problems involved in con-
solidating and streamlining the present tripartite bank regulatory 
system into one federal bank supervisory agency .145 
IV. CONCLlJSION 
The recent increase in the types and amount of bank securities 
activities has caused the Senate Securities Subcommittee, the 
SEC, and the Department of the Treasury to undertake a review of 
the public policy implications involved. Two major questions are 
143See note 5 and accompanying text supra. 
144See Verkuil, supra note 130, at 1366-67. 
145See note 3 and accompanying text supra. 
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involved: (l) whether any or all of the activities in question should 
be prohibited through amendment of the Banking Act of 1933 (the 
Glass-Steagall Act), and (2) what form of regulation by the SEC 
and the bank supervisory agencies is appropriate for those ac-
tivities that are not wholly prohibited. 
All three studies· have taken a relatively narrow approach to the 
problem, accepting the basic prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act 
and the analysis of the Supreme Court in Investment Company 
Institute v. Camp as largely beyond the scope of their inquiry. 
They have also defined the issues involved merely in terms of the 
competing arguments of the primary industry interest groups 
involved-the commercial banks and investment companies. 
A more appropriate line of inquiry would be to wholly reevaluate 
the Camp decision as well as the line of separation drawn between 
banks and investment banking by the Glass-Steagall Act in light of 
the problems presented by all bank securities activities and in the 
context of reform of financial institutions. Such a reconsideration 
compels the conclusion that the Supreme Court in Camp was 
incorrect, at least in terms of policy, in its conclusion that bank 
trust department securities activities do not present the same dan-
gers as bank commingled investment funds. On the contrary, con-
flicts of interest and other problems are inherent in large banks' 
trust department activities, and the Glass-Steagall Act restrictions 
should be replaced by a separation of large bank trust departments 
from their commercial departments. 
This separation offunctions would have several salutary effects. 
It would remove the present competitive advantages and potential 
for market domination by large banks as well as the conflicts of 
interest that are inherent problems in the union of a bank's com-
mercial and trust department activities. Greater competition would 
be injected into the marketplace if trust departments were allowed 
the freedom to compete and were subjected to the same regulation 
in their securities activities as investment companies and securities 
firms. Regulatory conflicts between the SEC and the bank super-
visory agencies would also be more easily resolved. These consid-
erations suggest that Congress has been far too timid in coming to 
grips with these problems and that a much broader approach is 
necessary in order to deal adequately with bank securities ac-
tivities. 
